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FRIVOLOUS CASES
Suja A. Thomas*
INTRODUCTION
The problem of "frivolous cases" is invoked a lot. Although this
term is used in the context of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, it is also used to justify many procedural and substantive
changes to the law. For example, concern about frivolous cases is in-
voked when explaining the need for procedures such as summary
judgment, motions to dismiss, heightened pleading, and caps, as well
as when referring to substantive areas such as prisoner cases and em-
ployment discrimination cases.
Cost, of course, is the worthy concern that underlies the use of the
term "frivolous cases." This Symposium Article argues, however, that
an actual discussion regarding costs and also the relationship of costs
to other important rights-such as the constitutional right to a jury
trial-tends not to occur when the term "frivolous cases" is invoked.
As a result, this Article reasons that the term "frivolous cases" should
be discarded and replaced with a substantive discussion of costs and
constitutional rights.
Part II argues that the term "frivolous cases" has been used preva-
lently to justify significant legal changes. Part III discusses the reasons
for the focus on frivolous cases and then asserts that the term itself has
tended to mask consequential changes. It contends that changes justi-
fied in terms of frivolousness largely have not been examined care-
fully, including to address the cost issue and to ensure the
constitutional integrity of the changes with respect to the Seventh
Amendment jury trial right. This Article concludes that the term
"frivolous cases" itself should be retired and substituted for a substan-
tive discussion of important interests, including costs and their rela-
tionship to the constitutional right to a jury trial.
* Professor of Law and Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Faculty Scholar, University of Illinois
College of Law. Thanks to Meaghan Bayer, a University of Illinois College of Law student, for
excellent work on this topic. I am grateful for discussions with and the comments of the follow-
ing: Paul Caron, James Pfander, Michael Moore, Margo Schlanger, Nicola Sharpe, Michael
Solimine, and Larry Solum. Thanks also to participants at the 15th Annual Clifford Symposium
and the University of Illinois College of Law faculty retreat.
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II. THE PREVALENT USE OF THE TERM "FRIVOLOUS CASES"
It seems that everyone is against frivolous cases. How can you not
be? Frivolous is frivolous. It's bad. And frivolous cases seem to
abound. But as much as everyone seems to be against frivolous cases
and frivolous cases seem to be everywhere,' disagreement exists on
what exactly constitutes a frivolous case.2 It has been said though,
borrowing from another area of law, that one knows it when one sees
it.3 One type of litigation that many think of as involving frivolity is
prisoner cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4 Others think of the em-
ployment discrimination cases that fill the federal docket.5 Such so-
called frivolous cases are a significant incentive for reform efforts by
Congress and the courts. 6 This Part discusses some of the major ef-
1. See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, Job-Discrimination Cases Tend to Fare Poorly in Federal Court,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A16 (quoting a lawyer who stated that "[c]ases that aren't settled
... often are frivolous and should be dismissed"); Editorial, Obama's Malpractice Gesture, WALL
ST. J., June 16, 2009, at A14 (referring to the prevalence of "frivolous suits").
2. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PENN. L. REV. 519, 520 (1996) ("We
have no... common agreement on what constitutes a 'frivolous suit."'); see also Sanford Levin-
son, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353,
378 (1986) (stating that it is difficult to distinguish between "weak" and "frivolous" cases);
Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, Re-
casting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 449-50 (2004) (giving examples of public, judicial, and
jury disagreement over what is frivolous). A similar argument to the one made in this Article
has been made regarding the term judicial activism. See Robert Justin Lipkin, We Are All Judi-
cial Activists Now, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 181 (2008).
3. See Robert Hermann, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 701, 705 (1972)
("Frivolousness, like madness and obscenity, is more readily recognized than cogently de-
fined."); see also William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (1988)
("Although the standard that governs attorneys' conduct is objective reasonableness, what a
judge will find to be objectively unreasonable is very much a matter of that judge's subjective
determination."); Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An Essay on
Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV. 65, 94 (1996) ("[Cllaims which appear frivolous and
baseless in the eyes of one judge may seem respectable losers to others.").
4. See Stephen W. Miller, Rethinking Prisoner Litigation: Shifting from Qualified Immunity to
a Good Faith Defense in § 1983 Prisoner Lawsuits, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 929, 930-31 (2009)
(citing Jon 0. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 519, 520-22 (1996)).
5. See Amanda Sue Nichols, Alien Tort Statute Accomplice Liability Cases: Should Courts Ap-
ply the Plausibility Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177,
2193 (2008); cf. Gerald E. Calvasina, Richard V. Calvasina & Eugene J. Calvasina, Frivolous
Employment Discrimination Litigation: Myth or Reality?, 6 J. LEGAL, ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES
27 (2003) (concluding that it is a myth).
6. Bone, supra note 2, at 521-22 (discussing changes to pleading, Rule 11, and summary judg-
ment requirements as well as the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and
the Prison Litigation Reform Act); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at 11:
A Commentary on the Supreme Court's 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 93, 98-100 (1993) (discussing the procedural response to the
perceived, real or not, explosion of frivolous cases). Judge Jack Weinstein has stated,
[F]rivolous litigation has been reduced in actual and relative numbers because of: 1.
The expense; 2. Expanded and more efficient discovery, which usually makes clear who
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forts that have been explicitly described as ways by which courts can
eliminate frivolous cases.
A. Summary Judgment
The Supreme Court has emphasized the relationship between sum-
mary judgment and the elimination of frivolous cases, stating that "to
the extent the litigation is frivolous, . . 'the plaintiff can be hastened
from [the] court by summary judgment." 7 Under summary judg-
ment, a court may dismiss a case before trial if the court determines
that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact."'8 The standard
established in the trilogy of Supreme Court cases on summary judg-
ment 9 in 1986 arguably made it easier to dismiss cases upon summary
judgment. 10 Under that standard, a case can be dismissed if a "rea-
sonable jury could [not find] for the nonmoving party."'1 Courts have
used summary judgment to dismiss many cases, including factually in-
should win and, if recovery is appropriate, how much it should be; 3. The frequent
resolution by administrative agencies of many matters (e.g., SEC and consumer safety)
in which they can impose fines; 4. Maturation of the law in many legal fields, enabling
attorneys to settle more rapidly because they understand what cases are worth due to
availability of information about other cases and the development of specialized bars;
5. Compulsory non-judicial settlement procedures to deflect cases from the courts (e.g.,
employment and brokerage arbitration agreements); and court-attached mediation and
arbitration services; 6. The reluctance, particularly of appellate courts, to allow juries to
decide cases-as demonstrated through much increased use of summary judgment,
Daubert-based motions to dismiss, and reversal of rulings for plaintiffs on appeal; and
7. The increased difficulty of sustaining a complaint in some fields because of, for exam-
ple, specialized pleading requirements, as in fraud and security cases.
Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government, of, by, and for the People: Notes for the
Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 104-05 (2008). Judge Weinstein has also
stated, "Procedural devices including motions to dismiss and summary judgment already func-
tion ... too vigorously-as screening devices for frivolous and improvable claims." Id. at 72. "It
is now harder for a plaintiff to enter the courts because of increased pleading burdens; extensive
use of summary judgment to take cases from juries; increased use of restrictive statutes of limita-
tions; and expansion of immunity, qualified immunity and executive and other privileges." Id. at
105.
7. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 422 (1976) (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159,
175 n.10 (1970)); see also Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settle-
ment Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REv. 1849 (2004) (discussing the prob-
lem of frivolous cases and advocating mandatory summary judgment such that settlements can
occur only after summary judgment review); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in
an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1667, 1684 (2008) (noting that
summary judgment, among other methods, is used by courts to dispose of supposed frivolous
civil rights claims).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
9. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
10. See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1851, 1856 (2008).
11. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
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tensive cases such as the employment discrimination cases that occupy
a large part of the federal docket. 12
B. Motions to Dismiss
The Supreme Court has also invoked the term "frivolous cases"
when referring to motions to dismiss. The Court has stated that
"[m]ost frivolous and vexatious litigation is terminated at the pleading
stage or on summary judgment. ' 13 Under a motion to dismiss, a court
can dismiss a case that "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted."'1 4 Until recently, cases were rarely dismissed upon a motion
to dismiss.15 The standard to dismiss a case centered upon whether
"the plaintiff [could] prove no set of facts in support of [the] claim
which would have entitled [the plaintiff] to relief. ' 16 Under the new
standard established in 2007 in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,' 7 and inter-
preted again recently in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,1 8 a case can be dismissed
more easily.1 9 A court can dismiss a claim if it is found not "plausi-
ble."'20 Under this standard, courts have used the motion to dismiss
much more often in order to dispose of cases, including factually in-
tensive employment discrimination cases that occupy a large part of
the federal docket. 21
12. See Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 141
n.5 (2007).
13. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities
Class Actions As Pragmatic Ex-Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 78-79 (2008) (mentioning
Rules 11, 12, and 56 as solutions for frivolous cases).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
15. See Thomas, supra note 10, at 1851. But see Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading:
Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 599 (2010) (suggesting,
through empirical evidence, that courts granted motions to dismiss much more often than was
thought under Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
16. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
17. Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
18. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
19. See Thomas, supra note 10, at 1851.
20. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
21. See Joseph Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employ-
ment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1026-41; see also Jess Bravin, New Look
at Election Spending Looms in September, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2009, at A8 (quoting Tom Gold-
stein, founder of SCOTUSblog, who stated that Iqbal will "be the most cited Supreme Court
case in a decade," and also quoting Richard Samp of the Washington Legal Foundation, who
stated that the Court responded with Iqbal because "[tihe court is sort of fed up with excesses in
the tort system and is looking for ways to try to eliminate frivolous lawsuits").
[Vol. 59:633
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C. Caps on Damages
Damages caps are also said to be a response to the filing of frivolous
lawsuits.22 As one example, Congress has enacted caps to limit the
compensatory and punitive damages available to a plaintiff in a Title
VII employment discrimination suit.23 In discussing the caps in Title
VII cases, the Second Circuit stated that "the purpose of the cap is to
deter frivolous lawsuits and protect employers from financial ruin as a
result of unusually large awards."'24 Thus, a plaintiff who seeks to
bring a frivolous case may not bring it if the damages that he may
recover are limited. 25
D. Prison Litigation Reform Act
Another response to frivolous cases has been the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA). 26 Congress enacted the PLRA to curb frivolous
litigation brought by prisoners. 27 In its discussion of the necessity of
the PLRA, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]n 2005, nearly 10 per-
cent of all civil cases filed in federal courts nationwide were prisoner
22. See David A. Hyman et al., Estimating the Effect of Damages Caps in Medical Malpractice
Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J. LEGAL ANAL. 355, 356 (2009) ("[C]aps on non-economic dam-
ages . . . are a silver bullet . . . simultaneously targeting frivolous lawsuits, excessive damage
awards, run-away juries, and high medical malpractice premiums."); Jonathon Klick & Catherine
M. Sharkey, What Drives the Passage of Damages Caps?, (Feb. 13, 2009) (unpublished manu-
script), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342535 (referring to state statutory caps being driven by frivo-
lous cases); see also Anita Bernstein, Complaints, 32 McGEOROE L. REV. 37, 44 (2000)
(discussing reforms, such as caps on damages and arguing "that suppression of complaints is an
important motive for their enactment").
23. 42 U.S.C. 1981a(b)(3) (2006).
24. Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 1997); see also EEOC v. CEC Entm't,
Inc., No. 98-C-698-X, 2000 WL 1339288, at *21 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 14, 2000).
25. See Luciano, 110 F.3d at 221; see also Klick & Sharkey, supra note 22.
26. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996).
27. Justice Lewis Powell has stated that
[a]lthough most of these cases [brought by state prisoners in federal court under § 1983]
present frivolous claims, many are litigated through the courts of appeals to this Court.
The burden on the system fairly can be described as enormous with few, if any, benefits
that would not be available in meritorious cases if exhaustion of appropriate state ad-
ministrative remedies were required prior to any federal-court litigation. It was prima-
rily this problem that prompted enactment of § 1997e.
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 535 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Riley v.
Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 917 (6th Cir. 2004) ("One of Congress' purposes in passing the PLRA was
to reduce the large number of frivolous prisoner lawsuits being filed in federal courts."). In a
1998 opinion that involved a prisoner claim, Justice John Paul Stevens referred to "plainly frivo-
lous" cases that "may [have been] motivated more by a desire to obtain a 'holiday in court,' than
by a realistic expectation of tangible relief." Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 596 (1998).
For an interesting analysis of a proposed change to ensure that meritorious prisoner suits are not
dismissed, see Miller, supra note 4.
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complaints challenging prison conditions or claiming civil rights
violations. "28
Under the PLRA, a court can dismiss prisoner cases that it deems
"frivolous. ' 29 This provision supplemented the already existing pre-
rogative of courts to dismiss frivolous cases filed in forma pauperis.30
The PLRA states that
[t]he court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party dis-
miss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under sec-
tion 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court
is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.31
In addition to establishing separate dismissal standards, the PLRA at-
tempts to eliminate frivolous cases by requiring prisoners to go
through an internal administrative process before filing a lawsuit.32
E. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Another congressional enactment to curb frivolous lawsuits is the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).33 Under the
28. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007) (citing a report of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts). In 2007, all civil rights and prison condition petitions brought by prison-
ers composed nine percent of the total filings on the federal docket. JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 145-46
tbl.C-2 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2006).
30. The federal in forma pauperis statute provides that "the court shall dismiss the case at any
time the court determines . . . the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (2006). In the context of in forma pauperis, the Supreme Court has stated
more generally that a frivolous claim "[l]acks an arguable basis in law or in fact." Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). The Court has also stated that "a court may dismiss a claim
as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are 'clearly baseless,' . . . a category encompassing
allegations that are 'fanciful,'... 'fantastic,' ... and 'delusional."' Id. at 32-33 (quoting Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327-28 (1992)). In Neitzke, the Court distinguished between cases
that fail to state a claim and those that are frivolous under the in forma pauperis statute. See
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325-31. In some circumstances, a case that fails to state a claim may not
necessarily be frivolous. See id. The term frivolous cases also comes up in the context of attor-
ney's fees in civil rights cases. The Eleventh Circuit has stated that "[a]lthough attorney's fees
are typically awarded to successful Title VII plaintiffs as a matter of course, prevailing defend-
ants may receive attorney's fees only when the plaintiff's case is 'frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation."' Quintana v. Jenne, 414 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chris-
tiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)); accord Garner v. Cuyahoga County
Juvenile Court, 554 F.3d 624 (6th Cir. 2009).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
32. See § 1997e(a).
33. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (interpreting the scienter pleading requirement of the PSLRA).
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PSLRA, to survive a motion to dismiss, in a securities fraud com-
plaint, a plaintiff must have pled misleading statements with "particu-
larity" and pled "a strong inference" of scienter. 34 The PSLRA also
"limit[s] recoverable damages and attorney's fees, provide[s] a 'safe
harbor' for forward-looking statements, impose[s] new restrictions on
the selection of (and compensation awarded to) lead plaintiffs, man-
date[s] imposition of sanctions for frivolous litigation, and authorize[s]
a stay of discovery pending resolution of any motion to dismiss. 35
F. Rule 11
Of course, the term "frivolous cases" is often invoked in the context
of sanctions under Rule 11. Rule 11 permits lawyers who bring frivo-
lous cases to be sanctioned.36 Over the twenty-five years of the Rule's
existence, however, there has been disagreement on what is actually a
frivolous case. In response to criticisms of an amended version of the
Rule-including, for example, that in applying the Rule, judges some-
times differed on whether a pleading was frivolous or "'well
grounded' in fact and 'warranted' in law" 37-Congress promulgated
the 1993 amendments. The 1993 amendments made sanctions discre-
tionary, removed discovery proceedings from the possibility of sanc-
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
35. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006); see also Tel-
labs, 551 U.S. at 321.
36. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
37. Kobayashi & Parker, supra note 6, at 108.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name .... The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer
has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowl-
edge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless
it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or
movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed
it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred be-
cause of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee.
FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (1992) (emphasis added) (amended in 1993); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983
Advisory Committee Note) (discussing the 1983 amendment); Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions
Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some 'Chilling' Problems in the Struggle Between Compensa-
tion and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1317-18 (1986) (discussing the 1983 amendment).
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tion, and created a "safe harbor" provision, among other things.38
The current Rule 11 provides, among other things, that attorneys must
certify to the best of their knowledge after conducting
an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances ... [that] the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or revers-
ing existing law or for establishing new law. . . [and that] the factual
contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery. 39
In 2005, the discussion to eliminate frivolous cases continued with
the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act (LARA), which proposed another
amendment to Rule 11.40 Although it was not enacted, among other
things, LARA would have made sanctions against lawyers who
brought frivolous cases mandatory and would have required payment
of attorney's fees and expenses if a case was deemed frivolous. U.S.
Representative Phil Gingrey stated that LARA's goal was to "pre-
vent[] frivolous lawsuits from closing the doors of justice for those
who have truly been harmed. '41 He went on to state that such frivo-
lous lawsuits have driven up costs in the courts.42 The discussion of
LARA and the text of LARA did not state, however, what was meant
by "frivolous. '43 In its letter of opposition to LARA, the American
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). Under Rule 11(c)(1)(A), attorneys are given the opportunity
to correct their alleged violations upon receipt of a motion from opposing counsel. The "safe
harbor" period begins to run upon service of the motion. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1993 Advisory
Committee Notes).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (emphasis added). The 1993 Advisory Committee Notes describe
the rule as requiring litigants to "stop and think" before filing cases in federal court. According
to a study of the Federal Judicial Center, judges have seemed to be relatively satisfied with the
changes. See DAVID RAUMA & THOMAS E. WILLGING, REPORT OF A SURVEY OF UNITED
STATES DISTRICT JUDGES' EXPERIENCES AND VIEWS CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2005); JOHN SHAPARD ET AL., REPORT OF A SURVEY CONCERNING
RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1995). When asked if they experienced
groundless litigation in federal civil cases, eighty-five percent of judges answered that it was a
small to no problem. RAUMA & WILLGING, supra, at 4. The Federal Judicial Center also in-
quired about how Rule 11 should be modified if at all. Eighty-one percent of the surveyed
judges believed that the rule was "just right" and thirteen percent answered that it should be
modified to increase its effectiveness in deterring groundless filing. Id. at 13-14. Only one per-
cent of all judges surveyed believed that it should be modified to avoid deterring meritorious
filings. Id. at 14.
There is a rule similar to Rule 11 in the appellate context. Under Rule 38, "[i]f a court of
appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice
from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double
costs to the appellee." FED. R. APP. P. 38
40. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 109th Cong. (2005).
41. 151 CONG. REC. H9288 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2005).
42. Id.
43. Id. at H9283-89.
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Bar Association expressed concern about the effects of the proposed
new rule on civil rights litigation and environmental litigation.44 Also
in objection to the proposed changes, Judge Robert Carter stated, "I
have no doubt that the Supreme Court's opportunity to pronounce
separate schools inherently unequal [in Brown v. Board of Education]
would have been delayed for a decade had my colleagues and I been
required, upon pain of potential sanctions, to plead our legal theory
explicitly from the start.
45
III. RETIRING THE TERM "FRIVOLOUS CASES"
The discussion in Part II illustrates that the term "frivolous cases"
has been used extensively to justify significant legal changes. This
Part explores the reason for the focus on frivolous cases, and then
argues that the focus should shift to a more specific discussion of costs
and other concerns such as the constitutional right to a jury trial.
A. The Focus on Frivolous Cases: Concern About Costs
There is a focus on frivolous cases because of cost. Frivolous cases
may be costly to the court system and to litigants. Frivolous cases
could consume court time when court resources are limited, and de-
fendants might need to devote significant resources to defend these
cases. Government officials are of particular concern. The Supreme
Court has stated that "firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivo-
lous lawsuits. '46 The Court has stated more generally that even "a
44. See id. at H9287 (Letter from Michael S. Greco, President, Am. Bar Ass'n (Oct. 10,
2005)).
45. 151 CONG. REc. H9286 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2005); cf. D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in
Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 57 (1976) ("Today's frivolity may be tomorrow's law, and the law often
grows by an organic process in which a concept is conceived, then derided as absurd (and clearly
not the law), then accepted as theoretically tenable (though not the law), then accepted as the
law."). The Supreme Court has stated that "not all unsuccessful claims are frivolous." Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329 (1989). Lucian Bebchuk has stated that frivolous can be equated
with non-meritorious. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shift-
ing Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule
11, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 373 (1996).
46. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 808 (1982) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). "When we see the myriad irresponsible and frivolous cases regularly filed in American
courts, the magnitude of the potential risks attending acceptance of public office emerges." Id.
at 827; cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2008) (discussing the problem of officials being
sued). But see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 795-96 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (noting
that "the majority[ ] admit[ted] that 'there is no historical record of numerous suits against the
President,"' and that "[e]ven granting that a Bivens cause of action did not become available
until 1971, in the 11 years since then there have been only a handful of suits").
2010]
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frivolous complaint that is withdrawn burdens 'courts and individuals
alike with needless expense and delay."' 47 The Seventh Circuit has
expressed its displeasure at frivolous cases because they "clog court
dockets and threaten to undermine the ability of the judiciary to effi-
ciently administer the press of cases properly before it."'48 Although
he is not certain whether there is a serious problem with frivolous
cases,49 Professor Robert Bone has concluded that "[f]rivolous litiga-
tion is problematic because it generates wasted litigation costs and un-
justified wealth transfers. ' 50 Moreover, it also "frustrate[s] settlement
of legitimate suits. '51
B. Shifting the Discussion from Frivolous Cases to Cost
and the Seventh Amendment
While frivolous cases impose potential costs on courts and defend-
ants, efforts to eliminate frivolous cases implicate the constitutional
right to a jury trial. For such cases to be dismissed through summary
judgment, motions to dismiss, or heightened pleading described
above, or alternatively, to be avoided through the threat of sanctions
and caps also described above, the cases must not require a jury trial.
However, the jury trial right has not been adequately explored in con-
junction with efforts to rid the courts of frivolous cases. Instead, ef-
forts to curb frivolous cases, including prisoner and employment
discrimination cases, continue to be adopted and expanded without
ensuring constitutional integrity. If a constitutional jury trial analysis
occurs, it tends to occur after a procedure is well-entrenched in the
court system, and thus the procedure is unlikely to be changed.
Summary judgment illustrates this phenomenon of using and chang-
ing procedure without constitutional analysis in the name of, at least
partly, the need to eliminate frivolous cases. For years, the Supreme
Court and commentators have stated that a 1902 case, Fidelity & De-
posit Co. v. United States, had stood for the proposition that summary
judgment was constitutional. 52 In that case, the Court upheld as con-
stitutional a procedure whereby a court decided whether a legal de-
fense existed after accepting as true the facts pled by the defendant. 53
47. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 411 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting and criticizing the majority opinion).
48. Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1985).
49. See Bone, supra note 2, at 579.
50. Id. at 576.
51. Id. at 597.
52. Thomas, supra note 12, at 163-66 (discussing Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187
U.S. 315 (1902)).
53. Id.
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As argued in an earlier article, summary judgment under Rule 56 is
not similar to the procedure in Fidelity.54 Under the summary judg-
ment standard, unlike the rule in Fidelity, a judge does not accept as
true the facts alleged by the non-movant.55 Instead, a judge decides
whether sufficient evidence exists to support the non-movant or in
other words decides whether a reasonable jury could find for the non-
movant.56 Indeed, despite citations to Fidelity for the proposition that
summary judgment is constitutional, the Court has never actually ana-
lyzed the constitutionality of summary judgment.5 7 No such analysis
has occurred despite the significant use of summary judgment to dis-
miss fact-specific cases, including those in the areas of antitrust and
employment discrimination, where there is a right to a jury trial.58
To summarize the "summary judgment is unconstitutional" argu-
ment that I have made previously, the Seventh Amendment provides
that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury, shall be re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law."' 59 The
Supreme Court has stated that the "common law" referenced in the
Seventh Amendment means the English common law of 1791.60 1791
is the date when the Seventh Amendment was adopted, and the En-
glish common law was the "common law" to which the Founders re-
ferred.61 Summary judgment violates the Seventh Amendment
because a judge makes a sufficiency of the evidence determination to
dismiss a case upon summary judgment, which was not permitted
under the common law of 1791.62 Under the common law of 1791, a
judge made a sufficiency of the evidence determination only upon a
motion for a new trial and could actually dismiss a case only if the
demurring party accepted the facts and the conclusions of the evi-
dence as true and no claim existed under those facts and conclu-
sions.63 Despite this constitutional predicament, summary judgment
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English Com-
mon Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 688 & nn.9-10 (2004).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also Thomas, supra note 12, at 145-60.
60. Parson v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830); see also Thomas, supra note 12, at
146 & n.25 (citing several cases including Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898)).
61. Thomas, supra note 12, at 146.
62. Id. at 145-60.
63. Id.
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continues to be used extensively in the name of eliminating frivolous
cases.
Similar to summary judgment, every other effort discussed in Part II
has a potential Seventh Amendment problem. Again, however, the
Seventh Amendment jury trial right has not been the focus or even a
factor carefully considered. Instead, the focus has been on frivolous-
ness and costs. These issues recently arose in the context of the mo-
tion to dismiss. In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the
Supreme Court considered the issue of the proper interpretation of
the "strong inference" of scienter pleading requirements in the
PSLRA, the failure of which to plead sufficiently would result in the
dismissal of the case.64 The Court stated that it was important to keep
in mind "the PSLRA's twin goals: to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven liti-
gation, while preserving investors' ability to recover on meritorious
claims."' 65 After the Seventh Circuit posed the potential Seventh
Amendment issue in addition to the main issue of how the require-
ment should be interpreted, the Court held that the Seventh Amend-
ment did not prevent Congress from setting forth pleading
requirements for statutes that it enacted. 66 The Court failed to ex-
amine the English common law when determining the constitutional
question and instead simply cited Fidelity to support its decision that
the Seventh Amendment did not prevent Congress from enacting
pleading requirements. 67 In this discussion, the Court mentioned
Congress's intent "to screen out frivolous complaints" in conjunction
with previous constitutional efforts to dismiss frivolous defenses. 68
The Court further emphasized that "[pirivate securities fraud actions
... can be employed abusively to impose substantial costs on compa-
nies and individuals whose conduct conforms to the law." 69
Just weeks earlier, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, an antitrust
class action, the Supreme Court considered the proper standard by
which a court can dismiss a case upon a motion to dismiss.70 The
Court "retire[d]" 71 the old standard to dismiss and held that a court
can dismiss a complaint if the court decides that the claim is not "plau-
64. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
65. Id. at 322.
66. Id. at 326-29.
67. Id.; Thomas, supra note 10, at 1863-69, 1874-79.
68. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 327-28 (comparing this to the use of "frivolous" in the rule at issue in
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902), which the Court found
constitutional).
69. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 313.
70. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
71. Id. at 563.
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sible."' 72 Throughout the decision, the Court emphasized the high
costs of discovery and also mentioned a concern about "frivolous
claims."'73 While the Court did not consider the constitutionality of
the new standard, it is implicit in the decision that the Court did not
think the new standard posed any constitutional problem. Like Tel-
labs, the constitutional provision at issue would have been the Seventh
Amendment. Under the common law relevant to the Seventh
Amendment analysis, no procedure existed whereby a court could de-
cide whether a claim was not plausible and dismiss the claim.7 4 Now,
like summary judgment, courts have used the new motion to dismiss
standard to dispose of more factually intensive cases, including em-
ployment discrimination cases, and given the most recent case of
Iqbal, the trend seems likely to continue. 75
Finally, similar to the procedures of summary judgment, the motion
to dismiss, and heightened pleading, the Seventh Amendment has not
been a focus in either the establishment of caps on damages or the
establishment of sanctions under Rule 11. The Supreme Court has
not decided the constitutionality of damages caps in Title VII cases,
despite the widespread use of them in Title VII cases, nor has it de-
cided the constitutionality of sanctions under Rule 11, despite courts'
imposition of sanctions over the many years. The constitutionality of
caps under the Seventh Amendment is suspect, however, because ju-
ries decided damages questions under the common law.76 Moreover,
a recent study has found that lawyers may bring fewer cases because
of the existence of caps, which may interfere with access to the
72. Id. at 556.
73. Id. at 558-60, 567 n.12; accord A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV.
431, 450-54 (2008) (discussing the "pleading policy" in Twombly of "screening of frivolous
cases"); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950, 1953-54 (2009) (mentioning the costs of
discovery); Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895 (2007) (discussing
the possibility that per se rules in antitrust "may increase litigation costs by promoting frivolous
suits against legitimate practices"). The Twombly dissent argued against the propriety of chang-
ing the motion to dismiss standard based on costs, stating that the courts can manage costs
through the "case-management arsenal." 550 U.S. at 593 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. See Thomas, supra note 10, at 1874-79.
75. See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 7764 (discussing the increase in grants of motions to dis-
miss after Iqbal); cf Seiner, supra note 21 (assessing the impact of Twombly in employment
discrimination cases); Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010)
(assessing impact of Twombly in disability cases).
76. See Suja A. Thomas, Federal Tort Reform and the Seventh Amendment (2006) (transcript
available at http://www.aals.org/am2006/program/papers/thurs/civilprocThomasspeech.pdf); cf.
Suja A. Thomas, Re-examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment,
64 OHIo ST. L.J. 731, 763-92 (2003) (discussing the jury's role with respect to damages).
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courts.77 Similarly with respect to Rule 11, the constitutional ques-
tions should be addressed and the answers not assumed.
As stated above, with respect to summary judgment, the motion to
dismiss, heightened pleading, damages caps, and sanctions, the Su-
preme Court, other courts, and Congress have explicitly mentioned
the concern about frivolous cases and cost in conjunction with the ne-
cessity of these procedures, but no significant constitutional analysis
has been conducted. The failure of the courts and the legislature to
pay attention to the Seventh Amendment seems to condone either the
use of cost in the assessment of the constitutionality of a procedure or
the trumping of costs over the Seventh Amendment.
Given the lack of significant discussion of cost and the Seventh
Amendment, a more substantive discussion about cost and the Consti-
tution and what is permitted under the Constitution is necessary, 78
rather than a non-substantive reference to frivolousness. This discus-
sion would include the role that cost can play in the Constitution,
rather than an assumption that cost trumps the Constitution. While
there have been scholarly attempts to better define what is frivolous,79
all of these attempts have implicitly assumed away or minimized any
constitutional problem, as have Congress and the Supreme Court.
And while Judge Frank Easterbrook does not think any vagueness
with regard to frivolous cases is problematic because uncertainty is
part of law, 80 if the reference to frivolous cases is eliminated, a more
substantive discussion about cost and the Seventh Amendment can
occur.
77. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martins, "The Juice Simply Isn't Worth the Squeeze in
Those Cases Anymore:" Damage Caps, 'Hidden Victims,' and the Declining Interest in Medical
Malpractice Cases (Am. Bar Found. Res. Paper Series), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357
092; cf. Kathryn Zeiler, Medical Malpractice Liability Crisis or Patient Compensation Crisis?, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 675 (2010) (discussing the possible harmful impact of noneconomic damages
caps).
78. Weinstein, supra note 6, at 112-13, 124-25 (discussing summary judgment as one possible
manner in which the Seventh Amendment is being violated). The Supreme Court's grant of
summary judgment in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), has been described as "an almost
unprecedented effort to replace the fact-finding power of the jury." Id. at 124.
79. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 2; Yablon, supra note 3.
80. Levinson, supra note 2, at 374. Judge Easterbrook has stated that
something is frivolous only when (a) we've decided the very point, and recently, against
the person reasserting it, or (b) 99 of 100 practicing lawyers would be 99% sure that the
position is untenable, and the other 1% would be 60% sure it's untenable. Either one
is a pretty stiff test.
Id. at 375.
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What might this discussion start to look like? 81 The analysis must
start with the Constitution-in this case the Seventh Amendment-
and what the Seventh Amendment was intended to do. While Profes-
sor William Nelson has proposed that the Seventh Amendment has
outlived its usefulness and that cost matters should reign supreme, 82
the jury remains a part of the constitutional structure just like the Leg-
islative Branch, the Judicial Branch, and the Executive Branch. 83 One
might counter, however, that cost-shifting was part of the English sys-
tem 84 and should be added to modern litigation. Professor Sanford
Levinson asserts that "[f]ee shifting.., can supply an economic con-
trol against frivolity that is otherwise lacking. '85 However, fee-shift-
ing may not be the right answer. To understand any appropriate role
for fee-shifting, fee-shifting now and under the common law should be
studied, including modern changes to cost, which include discovery. 86
Regardless of the result of this discussion, the proper conversation
should occur. Right now, though, cost is trumping the Constitution.
There must be a balance that does not disregard the Constitution. If
cost is to be taken into account in the decision of whether a procedure
is to be used, the decision should explicitly discuss cost in the analysis
of the procedure's constitutionality, and the use of cost should be jus-
81. Cf. Locke v. Karass, 129 S. Ct. 798 (2009) (First Amendment and union dues). In the
context of the Eight Amendment, Justice Antonin Scalia has noted,
Those costs, those burdens, and that lack of finality are in large measure the creation of
Justice STEVENS and other Justices opposed to the death penalty, who have "encum-
ber[ed] [it]... with unwarranted restrictions neither contained in the text of the Consti-
tution nor reflected in two centuries of practice under it"-the product of their policy
views "not shared by the vast majority of the American people."
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1555 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Kansas v. Marsh, 548
U.S. 163, 186 (2006) (Scalia, J. concurring)).
82. See William E. Nelson, Summary Judgment and the Progressive Constitution, 93 IOWA L.
REV. 1653, 1660-64 (2008).
83. See Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Still Unconstitutional: A Reply to Profes-
sors Brunet and Nelson, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1667, 1678-84 (2008); Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Mod-
esty and the Jury, 76 COLO. L. REV. 767 (2005).
84. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 & n.18 (1975).
85. Levinson, supra note 2, at 374; Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regula-
tion of Court Access, 94 IowA L. REV. 873, 928-30 (2009) (discussing fee-shifting as an alterna-
tive to deter meritless suits); Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Question, 61 BAYLOR L. REV.
90, 102-07 (2009) (discussing arguments regarding fee-shifting); cf. Kansas v. Colorado, 129 S.
Ct. 1294, 1298 (2009) (discussing the "American rule" under which each party bears its own
costs).
86. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Thurgood Marshall Meet Adam Smith: How Fee-Shifting Statutes
Provide a Market-Based System for Promoting Access to Justice (Though Some Justices Don't
Get It) (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-06-01, June 15, 2009), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1407275 (discussing the importance of fees to lawyers who bring civil rights
claims); Bebchuk, supra note 45, at 373 (discussing plaintiffs' behavior under the American and
British rules).
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tified. Talking about frivolousness in an amorphous manner allows
cost not to be defined, and thus, cost also not to be properly taken
into account. It is time to have the right discussion, and eliminating
the term "frivolous cases" would help begin this conversation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The concern for frivolous cases in the federal courts abounds. This
signifies worry about the cost to the courts and the cost to the parties
defending the actions. Congress and the Judiciary have reacted to the
concern about frivolous cases through legislative and judicial pro-
nouncements, many of which have resulted in cases being dismissed
prior to trial as well as damages being capped and sanctions being
imposed. These efforts have not carefully considered, though, the ef-
fect of these changes on the constitutional right to a jury trial. Thus,
the term "frivolous cases" has not been useful to promote the proper
discussion that needs to be had regarding costs and rights, including
the jury trial right, and the term should be replaced with that very
discussion.
[Vol. 59:633
